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Abstract
How might a low lending costs prompt lenders to include uncreditworthy borrowers in
their portfolio? This paper presents a theoretical study into how lender competition can
a⁄ect borrower quality, especially in a low interest rate setting. I study equilibria where
lenders compete aggressively by poaching on rivals￿clients. Poaching is impeded because
rivals not only have superior information about the quality of existing (creditworthy) clients
but also uncreditworthy types in the borrower population. Screening is costly, and the
uninformed lender￿ s ability to use collateral as a screening mechanism depends on its cost
advantage over its informed rival (i.e., relative levels of lending costs). Importantly, the
uninformed lender can pool uncreditworthy borrowers with creditworthy types in low interest
rate settings (i.e., for low absolute level of lending cost). Therefore, while a secular decline
in lending costs leaves the uninformed lender￿ s ability to screen uncreditworthy borrowers
unchanged, it opens the opportunity for them to pool these borrowers with creditworthy
types. This not only facilitates entry of outside lenders into ￿high-risk￿credit markets, but
also makes it optimal for them to poach borrowers from rivals by including uncreditworthy
borrowers in their loan portfolio. Equilibrium lending behavior in this setting can also
explain the phenomenon of cream-skimming on entry by outside (foreign) lenders.
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11 Introduction
Financial institutions reacted to the surplus of available funds by competing ag-
gressively for borrowers, and, in the years leading up to the crisis, credit to both
households and businesses became relatively cheap and easy to obtain... Unfortu-
nately, much of this lending was poorly done, involving, for example, little or no
down payment by the borrower or insu¢ cient consideration by the lender of the
borrower￿ s ability to make the monthly payments.1
How might ￿aggressive￿lender competition in a low cost environment prompt lenders to
include uncreditworthy borrowers in their loan portfolio? How does strategic lending behav-
ior interact with information asymmetries in credit markets to produce a deterioration of loan
quality? These questions lie at the heart of how events and policy might conspire to precipi-
tate ￿nancial crises. Although the importance of these questions is widely appreciated, less is
understood by way of which this causal link can be established.
This paper is a theoretical study of how lender competition in a low interest rate setting can
a⁄ect lending standards. It studies an environment in which lenders lend aggressively, poaching
borrowers from rivals, in a bid to increase pro￿ts by gaining market share. The impediment for
lenders that seek to poach clients of rival lenders is that rivals have superior information about
the quality of existing clients. Informed lenders typically gain knowledge about borrower quality
from previous lending relationships (see Boot, 2000 and references therein). Consequently, their
lending rates to existing customers are adjusted according to the customer￿ s credit risk.2 In
addition, the informed lender is likely to have identi￿ed a section of the borrower population
as bad risk: borrowers whose likelihood of default is so high that it is not pro￿table to lend to
them at any rate.3 Although this implies that such borrowers are likely to be denied loans from
their current (informed) lenders, they may choose to apply for loans from other (uninformed)
1Remarks by Chairman Ben Bernanke, in a speech titled Four Questions about the Financial Crisis at the
Morehouse College, Atlanta, Georgia, April 14, 2009
2Under adverse selection, riskiness is an exogenous and unobservable characteristic of agents. Accordingly, the
characterization of risk throughout this article refers to unobservable risk (i.e., risk conditional on observables).
3Even though existing customers are deemed creditworthy, they can di⁄er in their credit risk. Accordingly,
the paper will distinguish between two types of good-risk or creditworthy borrowers: high-risk and low-risk
borrowers. A third category of borrowers will be classi￿ed as bad-risk or uncreditworthy borrowers.
2lenders in the future (Sharpe, 1990). This has important implications for borrower poaching
and lender competition in credit markets.
In this paper, I examine the problem of competition between an informed lender and an
uninformed lender, in which the informed lender￿ s information advantage not only includes
its own clients but extends to uncreditworthy borrowers as well.4 Accordingly, I assume that
the informed lender has knowledge about prospective uncreditworthy borrowers from previous
transactions. Therefore, not only does the uninformed lender have to sort creditworthy bor-
rowers of di⁄erent risk quality, but it also has to avoid lending to uncreditworthy borrowers.5
Following Besanko and Thakor (1987), I assume that the uninformed lender uses collateral to
screen out bad risks and to sort high-risk borrowers from low-risk ones. The use of collateral
is a costly and ine¢ cient screening mechanism because the value of the collateralized asset in
use is higher than the salvage value of the collateral to the lender when the borrower defaults.
The results of this paper are summarized as follows. Equilibrium contract o⁄ers depend on
three features of the model, namely, (i) the distribution of types in the borrower population,
(ii) the relative levels of the lending cost of the uninformed and the informed lender and, most
notably, (iii) the absolute level of the lending cost. The use of collateral as a screening device is a
costly process and the informed lender does not require borrowers to post collateral. However,
the uninformed lender￿ s use of collateral as a screening device involves this additional cost,
which it must recover to compete with its informed rival. Consequently, screening equilibria in
which the uninformed lender is able to attract borrowers away from the informed lender as well
as sort borrower types depends on the cost advantage of the uninformed lender (i.e., the relative
levels of lending costs). In contrast, the uninformed lender￿ s ability to pool borrowers depends,
in addition to its having the cost advantage, on the absolute level of its lending cost. When
the uninformed lender pools superior types with inferior types, it expects to o⁄set the losses
from the latter with pro￿ts from the former. The uninformed lender￿ s o⁄ers to superior types
under pooling are bounded above by borrowers￿reservation payo⁄, namely, the o⁄ers made by
4Alternatively, this problem can be viewed as problem of entry into credit markets, wherein the informed
lender is an inside lender (incumbent who already exist in this market) that have arguably better information
on borrower quality than outside lenders (entrants or new lenders).
5Sengupta (2007) examines a problem of entry in which lenders compete over the incumbent￿ s clients only.
The question addressed in this paper takes on greater relevance because it relaxes the restrictive assumption that
all borrowers are known to be creditworthy.
3its informed rival. This implies that for a given cost advantage of the uninformed lender, its
pro￿ts from creditworthy types under pooling do not change with the absolute level of lending
costs. In contrast, the expected losses in lending to uncreditworthy types decline with decreases
in lending cost. At very low costs of lending, these expected losses are signi￿cantly less, making
it optimal for the uninformed lender to include uncreditworthy types in its portfolio.
The highlight of these results is that there exist equilibria wherein a low lending cost makes it
optimal for the uninformed lender to include uncreditworthy borrowers in its portfolio.6 A cost
advantage for the uninformed lender is a necessary but not a su¢ cient condition for successfully
poaching creditworthy clients from the informed lender. In any separating equilibrium wherein
it successfully secures creditworthy types, the uninformed lender needs this cost advantage
to be su¢ ciently large. Otherwise, it cannot poach clients from the informed lender because
its cost advantage cannot cover for the costs of screening uncreditworthy borrowers. A small
cost advantage precludes screening equilibria; but in a low rate environment￿ as would prevail
if there was a signi￿cant decline in the lending cost￿ it opens the opportunity for pooling
creditworthy borrowers with non-creditworthy types.7
In addition to the principal result above, the model o⁄ers an equilibrium wherein the in-
formed lender retains high-risk clients while the uninformed lender is able to secure borrowers
of the highest quality (lowest risk) despite its information disadvantage. This occurs when the
uninformed lender￿ s o⁄er of a signi￿cantly lower rate combined with a su¢ ciently high collateral
requirement attracts borrowers of the highest quality only. This ￿cream-skimming￿result ￿nds
support in some of the evidence on foreign lenders in poor countries (see Dietragiache et al, 2008
and references therein). While this literature has attributed this phenomenon to di⁄erences in
lending technologies between foreign and domestic lenders, this model shows that such a result
can be derived from a general model of asymmetrically informed lenders (see Section 5 for more
details).
6Naturally, a low lending cost implies an increase in the pool of creditworthy borrowers, because borrowers
deemed uncreditworthy at the higher rate are now creditworthy. However, the pooling equilibrium considered
here involves the inclusion of borrowers who are uncreditworthy even at the lower rate.
7The result is similar to the ￿overlending￿ problem in De Meza and Webb (1987). However, the lack of
borrower screening in De Meza and Webb (1987) renders vacuous any discussion of lending standards (see
Section 5 for details). Notably, such pooling equilibria do not exist in traditional competitive screening models
(Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976 and Wilson, 1977). However, they have been shown to exist under fairly elaborate
settings in Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002) and Martin (2007).
4There is a growing literature on how lender competition a⁄ects lending standards. For
example, Ruckes (2004) and Dell￿ Ariccia and Marquez (2006) attribute changes in bank lending
to exogenous changes in the demand for credit during the upward phase of the credit cycle.
In contrast, this paper attributes such changes to the supply of funds, in particular, a decline
in lending costs. This feature ￿nds support in recent empirical work on risk-taking by lenders
(JimØnez et al. 2007, Ioannidou et al. 2009, and Maddaloni and Peydro, 2009). In a similar
vein, Rajan (1994) studies how supply side factors, like reputational concerns of bank managers,
a⁄ect lending behavior of banks. In credit booms, reputation concerns can lead bank managers
to hide losses and adopt a liberal credit policy to improve the market￿ s assessment of the bank
performance. However, because markets are more forgiving in times of a systemic adverse
shock, managers coordinate to tighten credit policy. Although the mechanism outlined in
this paper is signi￿cantly di⁄erent, the results provide support for Rajan￿ s hypothesis. For
example, a low lending cost assists a liberal credit policy by allowing bank managers to absorb
realized and expected losses, whereas a higher lending cost would prompt more managers to
screen borrowers. Finally, in contrast to this paper and the previous work mentioned above,
Gorton and He (2008) study ￿ uctuations in bank lending behavior that are driven by strategic
interactions and not exogenous changes in the economic environment.
The work closely related to this paper is Dell￿ Ariccia and Marquez (2006), in which the
uninformed lender is unable to distinguish between ￿lemons￿rejected by the incumbent and
new borrowers shopping around for lower interest rates (Dell￿ Ariccia et. al, 1999, Dell￿ Ariccia
and Marquez, 2004). An interesting feature of these models is that the informed lender suc-
cessfully retains all of its creditworthy clients, and therefore, lenders e⁄ectively compete for
new borrowers only.8 In this setting, equilibrium behavior depends on the proportion of new
(unknown) borrowers in the population. Yet, at any given time, the number of new entrepre-
neurs seeking credit could be small when compared with the number of existing ￿rms in the
market. In contrast, this paper models the information problems faced by banks in lending to
existing borrowers, such as that described in the conventional bank lending channel (Bernanke
8DellArricia et al. (1999), DellArricia and Marquez (2004) also model a similar setting that precludes borrower
poaching.
5and Blinder, 1988).9
Also related to this paper, are two strands of literature outlined in Bernanke and Gertler
(1999) that discuss how loan quality is adversely a⁄ected at the upward phase of a credit cycle.
One strand explores how concerns about ￿nancial instability arise when ￿nancial liberalization
(e.g., deregulation in the banking sector) is not well coordinated with the regulatory safety nets
(e.g., deposit insurance and lender-of-last-resort provisions as in Keeley (1990) and Besanko
and Thakor (2004)). While much of this literature relies on the agency problems that arise
out of deposit insurance, this paper shows that such excessive risk-taking can occur even in the
absence of such insurance. In this sense, the implications of the model have a broader appeal to
all ￿nancial intermediaries and not just depository institutions. A second strand of literature
studies how credit quality deteriorates during the upward phase of the credit cycle through the
asset-based lending channel. Competitive leveraged bidding can raise asset prices, which in turn
encourages further lending against these assets, increasing demand and asset prices through a
dynamic multiplier e⁄ect (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). Finally, the deterioration of loan quality
comes about as lenders become less concerned about the ability of the borrowers to repay loans
and instead rely on further appreciation of the asset to shield themselves from losses (Mishkin,
2008).
The causal link described in the paper is independent of the traditional asset-based lending
mechanism. The emphasis here lies in the role of lender competition and information asymmetry
in establishing the causal link between a low lending cost and a decline in borrower quality.
Nevertheless, it is important to mention that the two mechanisms are not in con￿ ict. In fact, it
is not di¢ cult to view the two mechanisms as reinforcing each other in practice to exacerbate
this decline in average borrower quality. I describe this in greater detail in Section 6, arguing
that the deterioration of borrower quality during the recent housing boom in the United States
could be explained in terms of this model. The model puts forward a theoretical explanation
as to how the decline in lending costs can be signi￿cant factor in explaining the acceptance of
9Bernanke and Gertler (1995, p. 40) describe this channel as follows. ￿Banks, which remain the dominant
source of intermediated credit in most countries, specialize in overcoming informational problems and other
frictions in credit markets. If the supply of bank loans is disrupted for some reason, bank-dependent borrowers
(small and medium-sized businesses, for example) may not be literally shut o⁄ from credit, but they are virtually
certain to incur costs associated with ￿nding a new lender, establishing a credit relationship and so on.￿
6higher default risk when extending loans.10 In addition to theoretical work, there is a signi￿cant
volume of empirical studies that examine how bank lending standards change (from tightness
to laxity) over the credit cycle.11 In Section 6, I discuss how the results obtained in the paper
￿nd support in recent empirical work.
An important concern here is whether the results emphasized in this paper can be established
in a more parsimonious model. In Section 5, I put forward the reasons as to why this concern
is misplaced. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the basic setup
for the model. Section 3 describes the set of candidate equilibria in which borrowers go to the
uninformed lender for loans. Section 4 uses numerical methods to solve for equilibria of the
model. In particular, this section determines the conditions under which the candidates listed
in Section 3 emerge as the equilibria of the game. Section 5 provides a discussion of the results.
Section 6 discusses the implications of this result in the context of the current crisis in the
subprime mortgage market in the United States and Section 7 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
The basic setup of this paper is similar to that of Besanko and Thakor (1987). Entrepreneurs
(also called borrowers) can borrow a dollar from a lender and invest in a project. The project
returns x if it succeeds (with probability 1￿￿) and zero if it fails (with probability ￿). Lenders￿
loan contracts consist of a repayment R and a collateral requirement C. Borrowers￿reservation
utility and lenders￿lending cost are denoted by V 0 and ￿, respectively. A lender can recover
only a fraction, ￿, of the collateral, which the borrower loses if she defaults on the loan (0 <
￿ < 1). Thus, the parameter ￿ is a measure of the disparity in the borrower and lender
valuation of collateral. Both lenders and borrowers are risk neutral. Lenders￿pro￿ts from the
loan contract (R;C) is given by ￿(R;C;￿) = (1 ￿ ￿)R + ￿￿C ￿ ￿, while a borrower￿ s payo⁄
under the same contract is V (R;C;￿) = (1￿￿)(x￿R)￿￿C. Therefore, a loan contract (R;C)
10The proximate cause of the low cost of lending is attributed to what Bernanke (2005) described as the
Global Savings Glut (see Caballero et al. 2008). Some observers have also attributed this in part to the easing
of monetary policy by the Federal Reserve which lowered the target federal funds rate from 6.5 percent in July
2000 to 1 percent in April 2004.
11This includes earlier empirical work by Asea and Blomberg (1998), Lown and Morgan (2003), Berger and
Udell (2004) and some more recent studies by Jimenez et al. (2007) and Ioannidou et al. (2009).
7generates a social surplus of [(1￿￿)x￿￿￿V 0]￿(1￿￿)￿C. Notably, a strictly positive collateral
requirement entails a deadweight loss of (1￿￿)￿C, implying that, ceteris paribus, zero-collateral
loan contracts are ￿rst-best.
The model assumes a ￿xed pool of borrowers indexed by their risk parameter, ￿, the probabil-
ity of default. The fraction ￿l of entrepreneurs are low-risk (￿ = ￿l), the fraction ￿h of borrowers
are high-risk (￿ = ￿h), and the fraction ￿b are bad-risk types (￿ = ￿b), with 0 < ￿l < ￿h < ￿b < 1
and ￿h + ￿l + ￿b = 1. Bad-risk borrowers are uncreditworthy in that the surplus generated on
loans to them is strictly negative (i.e., (1￿￿b)x < ￿ +V 0, for all ￿). Both high-risk and low-risk
borrowers are creditworthy (or ￿good￿ -risk) in that all loan contracts generate a positive social
surplus (i.e., (1￿￿k)x > ￿ +V 0, where k = g = h;l). Stated di⁄erently, a lender with complete
information would always extend loans to good risks and deny them to bad risks. Throughout,
we will impose the boundary condition [(1 ￿ ￿g)(1 ￿ ￿b)x ￿ (1 ￿ ￿g)V 0 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿b)￿] > 0 for
g = h;l. This condition ensures that uncreditworthy types do not ￿nd the lenders￿competitive
o⁄ers to creditworthy types unattractive.
In this setting, this paper analyzes competition between an informed (incumbent) lender
that has complete information about borrower creditworthiness and an uninformed lender (new
or outside lender) that is unable to distinguish between borrowers￿risk types. The informed
lender (or Lender-I) is (pre-entry) a price-setting monopolist whose lending cost is ￿I. The
uninformed lender (or Lender-U) is a new or outside lender whose lending cost is ￿U. Lender-
I￿ s private information here extends not only to its existing (and therefore) creditworthy clients
but also to other ￿prospective￿uncreditworthy borrowers that Lender-U would like to avoid.
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The timing of the game can be described as follows. Nature selects borrower types. The
informed lender can distinguish borrower types and o⁄ers one contract for each type. The
uninformed lender cannot distinguish between types and therefore o⁄ers a menu of contracts.
Lenders o⁄er contracts simultaneously. Finally, borrowers either accept or reject contracts.
8After eliminating a set of dominated strategies for the informed lender, I describe the set of
contracts that Lender-I can o⁄er in equilibrium in terms of the following lemma:
Lemma 1 For borrowers of type k = b, the informed lender denies credit. For borrowers












1￿￿g and ￿ Rg = x ￿ V 0
1￿￿g are the ￿rst-best (zero-collateral)
minimum and maximum repayments, respectively.
Proof: See appendix.
Since the informed lender denies credit to bad-risk types, they continue to receive their
reservation payo⁄ V 0. Also, the contract (R
ﬂ
I
g(￿I);0) yields borrower g = h; l, the maximum
utility Lender-I can provide, denoted ￿ V I
g (￿I), and is de￿ned by
￿ V I
g (￿I) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿g)x ￿ ￿I;g = h;l:
The uninformed lender faces borrowers with two di⁄erent types of participation constraints.
For good risks (k = g = h;l), the participation constraints are determined by the payo⁄s that
the borrowers receive from loan contracts o⁄ered by the informed lender, V I
g . For bad risks (k =
b), however, the participation constraint is given by V 0, the reservation utility of the borrower
(the opportunity cost of her time). In the same vein, the informed lender￿ s equilibrium o⁄er
from the set ZI
g(￿I) depends on Lender-U￿ s o⁄er in equilibrium. Stated di⁄erently, Lender-I￿ s
o⁄er in set ZI
g(￿I) seeks to match the highest payo⁄ that Lender-U can provide a creditworthy
borrower.
I focus exclusively on pure strategy equilibria. Without loss of generality, I hold the un-
informed lender￿ s lending cost constant at ￿U and vary the informed lender￿ s lending cost ￿I.
As is standard in the principal agent literature, I will assume that if the borrower is indi⁄erent
between two loan contracts o⁄ered by the same lender, the contract that the lender prefers is
chosen. Also, if a borrower is indi⁄erent between contracts o⁄ered by either lender, in equilib-
rium, she chooses to borrow from the lender that makes higher pro￿ts from the contract.12
12Suppose a borrower is indi⁄erent between loan contracts o⁄ered by two lenders with one of the lenders
93 Candidate Equilibria
This section provides an intuitive discussion of the (candidate) equilibria of the model. A
rigorous treatment of the results referred to in this section, is provided in the appendix.13 I
begin with a description of the candidate equilibria for a particular case of this model￿ namely,
the situation in which the uninformed lender screens all borrowers. Following this, I describe
other candidate equilibria of the model. In the next section, a solution to the model is provided
showing how each of the candidates (described below) emerge as the (￿nal) equilibria of the
model under di⁄erent sets of parameter values.
How might the uninformed lender successfully sort all creditworthy types? Lender-U can
successfully sort all borrowers only if its incentive scheme yields each borrower at least as much
payo⁄ as that from contracts o⁄ered by Lender-I. Consequently, Lender-U faces borrowers
whose reservation utilities are determined by the maximum payo⁄ that Lender-I can o⁄er
borrowers. These reservation utilities for the high-risk and low-risk borrower￿ namely, ￿ V I
h
and ￿ V I






l ;0) in Figure 1. Figure
1 illustrates the (candidate) equilibria in (R;C) space. Borrowers￿ payo⁄s increase as one
moves southwest, while lenders￿pro￿ts increase to the northeast. Because the informed lender
denies credit to the bad risks, their reservation utility is V 0. This is shown in Figure 1 by the
indi⁄erence curve of the bad-risk type through points A and C.
A ￿rst candidate (screening) equilibrium, denoted as Screen-1, is one where the uninformed









to high risks, (R
ﬂ
I
l ;0) to low risks, and denies credit to bad-risk types. The bad-risk borrowers
reject o⁄ers of the uninformed lender. The good-risk types (both h and l) borrow from the
uninformed lender, selecting loan contracts with strictly positive collateral requirements. The
contract o⁄ers to high and low risks are shown as points A and B in Figure 1, respectively.
making zero pro￿ts. The other lender making higher (positive) pro￿ts can make o⁄ers that increase borrower
payo⁄ by reducing its pro￿ts. The lender making zero pro￿ts cannot do so and still break even.
13Statements of the lemmas and propositions referred to in this discussion and elsewhere in the paper are
provided in the appendix.






l , and C
U
l are provided in the appendix.
10Figure 1: Lender-U￿ s contract o⁄ers under di⁄erent equilibria in (R;C) space. Borrowers￿payo⁄s











h;0) and sorts low risks at (RU
l ;CU
l ). For Hybrid-2, Lender-U screens out bad risks and pools
good risks at (RU
g ;CU
g ). Finally, Lender-U o⁄ers (RU
h ;CU
h ) for Screen-2 and (RU
l ;CU
l ) for Screen-3.
The contract for low-risk borrowers has a lower repayment and a higher collateral requirement
than that for high-risk borrowers. Since inferior types try to mimic the superior types in this
competitive setting, the uninformed principal always chooses to o⁄er incentive schemes that
are just as good as the inferior agent￿ s outside alternative. It follows that Vb(RU
h ;CU
h ) = V 0
and Vh(RU
h ;CU
h ) = Vh(RU
l ;CU
l ) = ￿ V I
h . Evidently, local incentive constraints (i.e., incentive
constraints for adjacent types) bind in this screening equilibrium.
The cost of screening is borne only by the uninformed lender. Therefore, to successfully
screen or sort borrower types, the uninformed lender needs to have a large cost advantage
over its informed rival. Stated di⁄erently, this candidate equilibrium is feasible only if the
uninformed lender￿ s cost advantage is su¢ ciently large so that two screening cuto⁄s (one for
11each pair of adjacent types) are satis￿ed. The ￿rst cuto⁄ is ~ ￿
b;h
S for screening the bad-risk
types from the high-risk types, and the second is ~ ￿
h;l
S for screening the high-risk types from the
low-risk types. Also, as shown in the appendix, the screening cuto⁄s are independent of the











￿b(1 ￿ ￿h) ￿ ￿￿h(1 ￿ ￿b)
￿U +
(1 ￿ ￿)￿h(1 ￿ ￿h)
￿b(1 ￿ ￿h) ￿ ￿￿h(1 ￿ ￿b)
[(1 ￿ ￿b)x ￿ V 0]. (2)
Therefore, to sort all borrower types the uninformed lender￿ s cost advantage needs to be su¢ -




S ) > ￿U.
However, if for example, ~ ￿
h;l
S > ￿I ￿ ~ ￿
b;h
S > ￿U, the uninformed lender cannot sort good-risk
borrowers into high-risk and low-risk types, but it can still screen out bad risks. This gives us
a second candidate (screening) equilibrium, denoted as Screen-2, where the uninformed lender
secures the high-risk types by screening out bad risks. Since, ~ ￿
h;l
S > ￿I , it follows that, if o⁄ered
(RU
l ;CU
l ) would yield losses for Lender-U. Therefore, if we denote (R0
l ;C0
l ) to be the best o⁄er
that Lender-U can make to low-risk types, then ￿U
l (R0
l ;C0
l ) = 0. Consequently, the informed
lender o⁄ers (RI
l ;0) such that Vl(R0
l ;C0
l ) = Vl(RI
l ;0) and Vh(R0
l ;C0




just matches the payo⁄ from the best o⁄er that the uninformed lender can provide low-risk








h;0) to high-risks and denies loans to bad risks. Except for low-risk types, the
equilibrium behavior of agents in Screen-2 is similar to that in Screen-1. In Screen-2, low risks
borrow from the informed lender whose pro￿ts from low-risk types are strictly positive.
12TABLE 1. Lender-U￿ s o⁄ers under di⁄erent candidate equilibria
Candidate Pro￿t Customer types Menu of contracts Breakeven
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On the other hand, if ~ ￿
b;h
S > ￿I ￿ ~ ￿
h;l
S > ￿U, the uninformed lender cannot screen out bad-
risk types. However, Lender-U can sort good-risks into high-risk and low-risk types. This gives
us a third candidate (screening) equilibrium, denoted as Screen-3, where the uninformed lender
secures the low-risk types while the informed lender retains high-risk types. In this equilibrium,
Lender-U simply o⁄ers (RU
l ;CU
l ). Lender-I o⁄ers (R
ﬂ
I
h;0) even though the payo⁄to the high-risk




high-risks are just indi⁄erent between Lender-U￿ s o⁄er of (RU
l ;CU




split the market with only low-risk types borrowing from Lender-U.
In addition, if ~ ￿
b;h
S > ￿I ￿ ~ ￿
h;l
S > ￿U, then a fourth candidate (hybrid) equilibrium is possible
in this situation, denoted as Hybrid-1. In general, a hybrid equilibrium can be described as one
in which the uninformed principal pools or bunches o⁄ers to adjacent types while sorting (or
screening out) the third type. In Hybrid-1, the uninformed lender seeks to pool bad risks with






the informed lender￿ s o⁄ers are the same as that in Screen-1. In equilibrium, all borrowers
would go to the uninformed lender whose aggregate pro￿ts would depend on the distribution
of bad risks in the population. With ￿I ￿ ~ ￿
h;l
S , its pro￿ts from loans to low risks are non-
negative. However, by pooling bad risks with high risks, the uninformed lender can no longer
ensure strictly positive pro￿ts from its o⁄er of (R
ﬂ
I
h;0) unless the proportion of bad risks in
13the population is su¢ ciently small. I return to this point below in my discussion of pooling
equilibria.
The ￿fth candidate (hybrid) equilibrium, denoted as Hybrid-2, involves bunching good risks
and screening out bad risks. Here, the uninformed lender o⁄ers (RU
g ;CU
g ), where (RU
g ;CU
g ) is
shown by the point C in Figure 1.15 Since, the equilibrium involves screening out uncreditworthy
types while lending to the low-risk type, it follows that Vb(RU
g ;CU






g ). Again, the informed lender￿ s o⁄ers are the same as those in Screen-1. Lender-U￿ s
o⁄er is rejected by uncreditworthy type but accepted by both creditworthy types. Evidently,
the uninformed lender￿ s o⁄er in Hybrid-2 involves pooling and therefore is feasible only if the
proportion of high risks in the population is su¢ ciently small. Hybrid-2 is feasible for the
uninformed lender only if ￿I ￿ ~ ￿Y (￿h;￿l), where ~ ￿Y (￿h;￿l) denotes the hybrid cuto⁄ for the
uninformed lender.
The last two candidate equilibria involve pooling contracts. In Pool-1, the uninformed lender
pools all borrowers by o⁄ering (R
ﬂ
I
l ;0). This subsidizes losses from bad risks and high risks with
pro￿ts from low risks. Therefore, Pool-1 is feasible only when the proportion of low risks in the
population is high; this is denoted by the breakeven cuto⁄ ~ ￿1
P(￿h;￿l). The uninformed lender




h;0) and the breakeven cuto⁄ for such a contract is given by ~ ￿2
P(￿b;￿h). The contract
o⁄ers by the uninformed lender for each of the seven candidate equilibria are given in Table 1.
In summary, there are three categories of candidate equilibria: pooling, screening, and
hybrid. Within each category, candidate-1 has a larger number of customer types going to
the uninformed lender for loans than candidate-2 or candidate-3. For example, in candidate
equilibrium Hybrid-2, the uninformed lender screens out the bad risks but in Hybrid-1 it pools
them with high risks. In fact, if the uninformed lender can screen the low-risk borrowers (i.e.,
if ￿I ￿ ~ ￿
h;l
S ), then the uninformed lender￿ s pro￿ts from o⁄ers in Screen-1 dominate those from
o⁄ers in Screen-2. Similarly, the uninformed lender￿ s o⁄ers in Hybrid-1 dominate those in Pool-
2. Finally, the informed lender dominates if ￿I is strictly lower than all of the breakeven cuto⁄s
given in the last column of Table 1.




g are provided in the appendix.
144 Model Solution
The set of pure strategy (candidate) equilibria for the model are given in Table 1. The next
step is to determine which of these candidates emerge as the (￿nal) equilibrium of the model
for a given set of parameter values. The closed-form solutions to the lenders￿o⁄ers in each
equilibria are given in the appendix. These solutions are used to derive Lender-U￿ s pro￿ts
from its o⁄ers in each candidate equilibria as a function of parameters. From the set of pro￿t
functions, one for each of the equilibrium o⁄ers, Lender-U selects one that yields the maximum
(non-negative) pro￿ts. This gives us the optimal lending behavior and the optimal contract
o⁄ers of each lender for a given set of parameter values. Since the maximum is obtained over
a ￿nite set of values, each a function of the parameters, it provides us with a solution to the
model.
I de￿ne parameters x, V 0 and the three di⁄erent values of ￿, namely ￿b, ￿h, and ￿l to be
the primitives of the model. For a given set of primitives, the screening cuto⁄s ~ ￿
h;l
S and ~ ￿
b;h
S
in (1)-(2) vary with ￿. Since there can be in￿nite variations in the set of parameter values,
the exposition here is selective. The aim is to illustrate how institutional features and market
conditions a⁄ect lending behavior. This is done by using a numerical example showing how the
equilibria change with changes in parameter values of ￿b, ￿, and ￿U respectively. Recall that,
the solution to the model is obtained by ￿xing the value of ￿U. Nevertheless, it is interesting to
understand how di⁄erent values of ￿U yield di⁄erent solutions to the model. Therefore, changes
in ￿I (for a given ￿U) yield variations in the cost advantage of Lender-U whereas changes in ￿U
denote changes in its absolute level of lending costs.16
A closer look at the candidate equilibria in Table 1 reveals two types of costs for Lender-
U. The ￿rst type are screening costs that arise because of the expected deadweight losses in
liquidating collateral. This cost increases with decreases in ￿.17 Consequently, the smaller the
proportion ￿ that the lender can recover on default, the higher the cost of screening. Since,
the Lender-I does not require borrowers to post collateral, the screening costs impinge only on
16Needless to say, the entire exercise can be replicated by interchanging the roles of ￿
I and ￿
U to yield similar
results.
17As mentioned earlier, the cost of screening is given by the expected deadweight loss (1 ￿ ￿)￿C from the
collateral requirement on the loan.
15Lender-U. Consequently, the uninformed lenders￿ability to screen borrower types depends on
its cost advantage over Lender-I.
The second type arises from costs of cross-subsidization in pooling di⁄erent borrower types.
In pooling equilibria, pro￿ts from superior types are used to o⁄set losses from inferior ones.
Pooling costs increase with the proportion of inferior types in the pool, and therefore, these
equilibria prevail only when the borrower population has a su¢ ciently large proportion of
superior types. More importantly, Lender-U￿ s o⁄ers to superior types is bounded above by
Lender-I￿ s o⁄ers to this type. Therefore, pro￿ts from superior types are determined by the
relative levels of lending costs; pro￿ts remain unchanged with changes in the absolute levels of
lending costs. In contrast, losses from inferior types decrease with the absolute levels of lending
cost. As a result, the Lender-U￿ s ability to pool borrowers depends, in addition to its having
the cost advantage, on the absolute level of lending costs. Therefore, in describing the equilibria
of the model, it is critical to distinguish between the Lender-U￿ s cost advantage (￿I ￿ ￿U) and
the level of lending cost (the numerical value of ￿U). As will be illustrated below, the former
determines the Lender-U￿ s ability to screen borrowers, whereas the latter determines its success
in pooling borrower types.
I begin with a discussion of the equilibria for primitives of x = 3:99, V 0 = 2, ￿b = 0:25,
￿h = 0:065, ￿l = 0:052.18 For the given set of primitives, Figures 2, 3 and 4 describe solutions
to the model in (￿h;￿I)space for variations in parameter values of ￿b, ￿, and ￿U respectively.
The dotted lines in the graphs denote Lender-U￿ s lending cost, ￿U. The colored regions denote
equilibria in which Lender-U is able to secure at least one creditworthy borrower type. If Lender-
U￿ s cost advantage is su¢ ciently small, Lender-I dominates (i.e., all borrowers go to Lender-I
for loans), as shown by the white region above the dotted line in all Figures.19 Evidently,
Lender-I dominates in this region because Lender-U is unable to screen out bad risks despite
its cost advantage. On the other hand, if Lender-U￿ s cost advantage is very large, the lender can
successfully screen borrower types. Therefore, with a large cost advantage, Lender-U screens
borrower types as shown by the equilibria Hybrid-2 for low ￿h and Screen-1 for high ￿h.
18The choice of parameter values is motivated purely in terms of exposition; the aim here is to illustrate the
conditions under which each of the candidates emerge as equilibria in the model.
19Domination below the dotted line is trivial since, in that case, the informed lender has both cost and
information advantage.
16Figure 2: Solution in (￿h;￿I)space with variations in ￿b. The dotted lines in the graphs denote the
Lender-U￿ s lending cost, ￿U. The plots are drawn to parameter values x = 3:99, V 0 = 2, ￿b = 0:25,
￿h = 0:065, ￿l = 0:052 for ￿U = 1:07 and ￿ = 0:5. The value of ￿b varies from 0:06 in (a) to 0:12 in
(d).
As will be demonstrated below, most of the changes in the solution to the model are observed
for moderate cost advantage of Lender-U. I begin with four subplots in Figure 2 that describe
the solutions to the model for di⁄erent values of ￿b for given values of ￿(= 0:5) and ￿U(= 1:07).
For ￿b = 0:06, Figure 2(a) shows that the equilibria for a low cost advantage are dominated
by Pool-1, Pool-2 and Hybrid-1. However, for ￿b = 0:1, Figure 2(c) shows that equilibria for
a similar range of cost advantage is largely dominated by Screen-1, Screen-2 and Hybrid-2
wherein Lender-U screens out the bad-risk types. Naturally, the lower the proportion of bad-
risks in the population, the higher is the pro￿tability of adopting pooling strategies as opposed
to screening.
17Figure 3: Solution in (￿h;￿I)space with variations in ￿. The dotted lines in the graphs denote the
Lender-U￿ s lending cost, ￿U. The plots are drawn to parameter values x = 3:99, V 0 = 2, ￿b = 0:25,
￿h = 0:065, ￿l = 0:052 for ￿U = 1:07 and ￿b = 0:08. The value of ￿ varies from 0:35 in (a) to 0:75
in (d).
Next, parameter values ￿b = 0:08 and ￿U = 1:07 are used to generate Figure 3, which
describe solutions to the model in (￿h;￿I)space for di⁄erent values of ￿. The four subplots in
Figure 3 are solutions to the model for di⁄erent values of ￿. With a moderate cost advantage,
pooling yields higher pro￿ts for Lender-U at lower values of ￿, as shown in Figure 3(a). However,
screening replaces pooling at higher values of ￿. This follows from the fact that a higher
￿ implies a greater salvage value for the collateral used in screening. Therefore, a higher ￿
implies a lower cost of screening increasing the likelihood that screening yields higher pro￿ts to
Lender-U.
In addition, ￿b = 0:08 and ￿ = 0:5 yields Figure 4, which describe solutions to the model
18Figure 4: Solution in (￿h;￿I)space with variations in ￿U. The dotted lines in the graphs denote the
Lender-U￿ s lending cost, ￿. The plots are drawn to parameter values x = 3:99, V 0 = 2, ￿b = 0:25,
￿h = 0:065, ￿l = 0:052 for ￿b = 0:08 and ￿ = 0:5. The value of ￿U varies from 1:02 in (a) to 1:12 in
(d).
in (￿h;￿I)space for di⁄erent values of ￿U. For a given ￿U, distance above the dotted line
denotes the cost advantage of Lender-U ; determining the relative levels of the lending costs.
However, variations in ￿U as shown across the di⁄erent plots show changes in the absolute level
of lending costs. For lower values of ￿U, pooling borrowers yields higher pro￿ts for Lender-U
than screening uncreditworthy types (Figure 4(a)). However, Figure 4(d) shows that screening
equilibria dominate at higher ￿U. This result is described in greater detail below.
In the numerical example given above, the model does not describe a scenario in which
Screen-3 emerges as the equilibrium of the model. This is because for the numerical examples
considered above, ~ ￿
h;l
S > ￿I > ~ ￿
b;h
S > ￿U. However, for a di⁄erent numerical example where
~ ￿
b;h
S > ￿I > ~ ￿
h;l
S > ￿U, Screen-3 is shown an equilibrium of the model. Using primitives
x = 3:99, V 0 = 2, ￿b = 0:25, ￿h = 0:062, ￿l = 0:04, the set of parameter values ￿b = 0:06 and
19Figure 5: Solution in (￿h;￿I)space with variations in ￿U. The dotted lines in the graphs denote the
Lender-U￿ s lending cost, ￿. The plots are drawn to parameter values x = 3:99, V 0 = 2, ￿b = 0:25,
￿h = 0:062, ￿l = 0:04 for ￿b = 0:06 and ￿ = 0:5. The value of ￿U varies from 1:02 in (a) to 1:12 in
(d).
￿ = 0:5, yields ~ ￿
b;h
S > ~ ￿
h;l
S for low values of ￿U, namely ￿U = 1:02.20 In this scenario, Screen-3
emerges as an equilibrium in Figure 5(a). However, as ￿U increases, the equilibrium in Figure
5(d) is similar to that shown in the numerical example discussed above.
In what follows, I discuss features of the equilibrium for both numerical examples, in terms
of the four cases given below.




S g > ￿I > ￿U. Since Lender-U cannot screen adjacent types, the discus-
sion here will focus on the following three candidates: Pool-1, Pool-2, and Hybrid-2. Figures
20It is follows from (2) and (1) that there exists a ^ ￿
U such that ￿
U R ^ ￿
U , ~ ￿
h;l
S R ~ ￿
b;h
S . The closed form









. Strictly speaking, this cuto⁄ ^ ￿
U is an artefact of keeping ￿
U
constant while varying ￿
I. Intuitively, this implies that the nature of equilibria are di⁄erent for absolute values
of lending costs.
202-5 show that Lender-I can dominate in regions even if Lender-U has the cost advantage. This
holds true partly because, as mentioned earlier, screening out bad risks is costly. On the other
hand, pooling borrowers can be costly as well, and this cost depends on the proportion of inferior
types in the borrower population. In the absence of bad-risk types in the borrower population,
any cost advantage is su¢ cient for Lender-U to secure creditworthy types. However, as long
as there are uncreditworthy types, Lender-I can dominate the market even when its rival has
the cost advantage. This is shown by the clear (white) region just above the dotted lines in
Figures 2-5. However, if the proportion of bad-risk types (￿b) is su¢ ciently small or the salvage
rate (￿) of collateral is low (or both), pooling contracts are available to Lender-U as shown in
Figures 2(a) and (b) and 3(a) and (b).
In addition, if ￿h is low, then Lender-U either pools all borrowers (under Pool-1) or pools
the good risks while screening them from bad risks (under Hybrid-2). The cuto⁄ for Hybrid-2,
~ ￿Y (￿h;￿l), is increasing and convex in ￿h. A higher cost advantage is needed for pooling a larger
proportion of high risks in the population. Candidate Hybrid-2 dominates Pool-1 for higher ￿b
because a larger proportion of bad risks implies that it is now more pro￿table to screen them
out than it is to pool them with good risks.
On the other hand, if ￿h is high, Lender-U can pool them with bad risks under Pool-2.
An interesting feature of the equilibrium in these regions is that, while pooling is feasible for
high or low values of ￿h, Lender-I dominates for intermediate values of ￿h. This happens in
situations where the proportion of high risk is neither too large to be pooled with bad risks nor
too small to be pooled with low risks. In these regions Lender-U would ideally like to screen




S g > ￿I.
Case (ii) ~ ￿
h;l
S > ￿I > ~ ￿
b;h
S > ￿U. This situation is best illustrated in terms of Figure 2. For
low values of ￿b, the equilibrium is similar to that in the previous case: Pool-1 and Hybrid-
2 emerge as the equilibria for low ￿h, whereas Pool-2 is the equilibrium at high ￿h. But
whereas earlier Lender-I dominated at intermediate values of ￿h, Lender-U can now capture
the high-risk market by screening high risks from bad risks. This is shown by the region labeled
Screen-2 in Figure 2(a). Note that the size of this region increases (at the expense of Pool-2)
21with increases in ￿b because pooling higher proportions of bad risks is no longer pro￿table as it
increases costs of cross-subsidization. Therefore for higher values of ￿b, pooling equilibria are
replaced by Screen-2 (for high ￿h) and Hybrid-2 (for low ￿h) as shown in Figure 2(b)-(d).
Case (iii) ~ ￿
b;h
S > ￿I > ~ ￿
h;l
S > ￿U. This case is illustrated in Figure 5(a) and (b). Lender-U
cannot screen out bad risks from good-risks but can sort among good risk types. For high ￿h,
Hybrid-1 replaces Pool-2, because with ￿I > ~ ￿
h;l
S Lender-U sorts low-risk types while bunching
bad risks with high-risk types. For low ￿h, the equilibrium is given by Pool-1 or Hybrid-2, just
as in the previous case. However, unlike the previous case, Lender-U cannot screen high risks
from bad risks for the intermediate values of ￿h. Nor can it pool high risks, either with low
risks or with bad risks. Interestingly, because it￿ s screening o⁄er to low-risk types are rejected
by bad-risks, it can secure only low-risks under Screen-3. In this equilibrium, the high-risks
accept o⁄ers from Lender-I.




S ) > ￿U. This implies that the complete set of contracts listed
in Table 1 yields strictly positive pro￿ts to Lender-U. Among them, Lender-U￿ s o⁄ers in Pool-
2 are dominated by those in Hybrid-1, and its o⁄ers in Screen-2 and Screen-3 by those in
Screen-1. Consequently, Lender-U chooses among contract o⁄ers in the four alternatives: Pool-
1, Screen-1, Hybrid-1, and Hybrid-2. For large cost advantages of Lender-U, Hybrid-2 and
Screen-1 dominate because they not only screen out the bad risks but also include low-risk
types. Note, however, that for low ￿U, Lender-U￿ s o⁄ers in Hybrid-1 continue to dominate
those in Screen-1 for high ￿h despite the fact that Lender-U can now screen high risks from
bad risks. This is because the cost of pooling for low ￿U is still less than the costs of screening.
Another way of illustrating the full scope of possible equilibria is in terms of Figure 6,
which replicates the equilibria in Figure 3 in terms of three simplex diagrams. These diagrams
illustrate how the equilibria change with changes in the cost advantage of Lender-U.
22Figure 6: Three simplexes drawn to parameter values x = 3:99, V 0 = 2, ￿b = 0:25, ￿h = 0:065,
￿l = 0:052. The simplexes show the solution to the model for ￿U = 1:02 and ￿I = 1:042;1:047
and 1:05 respectively. The clear regions (in white) denote parameter values for which Lender-I
dominates. Note that for the parameter values under consideration ~ ￿
h;l
S > ~ ￿
b;h
S .
5 Discussion of Results
5.1 Lending to Uncreditworthy Borrowers
In this section, I discuss equilibria in which it is optimal for Lender-U to extend credit to un-
creditworthy types. As before, I restrict this discussion to the interesting case where Lender-U
has the cost advantage. In the equilibrium plots shown above, this is given by the distance
above the dotted line. From the discussion above, it is not di¢ cult to see that screening equi-
libria are more likely to prevail in market segments where (i) the proportion of bad-risk types
is not su¢ ciently small or (ii) the deadweight loss from collateral use is not su¢ ciently large, or
both. Conversely, low ￿ and low ￿b are favorable to the use of pooling strategies. The numer-
23ical solutions presented above show that even under conditions which are otherwise generally
favorable to screening equilibria, the solution to the model can change with the absolute value
of lending costs.
To illustrate this, I begin with a description of the equilibria (the solution to the model) for
the same set of parameter values ￿ = 0:5, ￿b = 0:08 and ￿U = 1:07 as shown in plots 2(b), 3 (c)
and 4 (c). Except for signi￿cantly high values of ￿h, the model solution predominantly comprises
of screening equilibria wherein Lender-U screens out uncreditworthy types. Interestingly, this
occurs even for situations where Lender-U￿ s cost advantage is not signi￿cantly high. Therefore,
the market equilibria is either dominated by Lender-I (as shown by the clear regions above
the dotted line) or Lender-U screens out bad-risk types and either pools creditworthy types (in
Hybrid-2 for low ￿h) or captures just the high risk type (in Screen-2 for high ￿h).
Starting with these market conditions, lowering lending costs can change the solution sig-
ni￿cantly as shown in Figure 4. A low cost environment makes it optimal for Lender-U to
pool borrowers as shown in plots 4(a)-(b). In 4(a), a signi￿cantly low lending cost is shown to
facilitate pooling for almost all values of ￿h. Moreover, pooling is optimal even for a very high
cost advantage of Lender-U￿ that is, for high cost advantages that would enable it to screen all
borrower types. In sum, lowering lending costs signi￿cantly increase the range of values over
which pooling becomes the optimal strategy for Lender-U.
The intuition behind this result can be described as follows. Pooling equilibria allow lenders
to o⁄set losses from inferior (uncreditworthy) types with pro￿ts from superior (creditworthy)
types. As described in Section 3, Lender-U￿ s o⁄ers under pooling are bounded above by bor-
rowers￿reservation payo⁄, namely, the o⁄ers made by its informed rival Lender-I. This implies
that for a given cost advantage of Lender-U, its pro￿ts from superior (creditworthy) types un-
der pooling do not change with the absolute level of lending costs. In contrast, the expected
losses in lending to inferior (uncreditworthy) types decline with decreases in lending cost. At
very low costs of lending, these expected losses are signi￿cantly less when compared to costs of
screening, making it optimal for Lender-U to include uncreditworthy types in its portfolio.
Whereas Lender-U￿ s ability to screen borrowers depends on its cost advantage over its rival
24(and hence the relative levels of lending costs), its ability to pool borrowers depends on the
absolute level of its lending costs. Herein lies the causal link between a low cost of lending and
the extension of credit to uncreditworthy borrowers. A signi￿cantly low value of the lending
cost allows uninformed lenders to poach borrowers by lowering collateral requirements for all
borrowers. Starting from a point where the lending costs are (moderately) high, consider a
situation where a signi￿cant increase in the supply of funds exogenously lowers the cost of
lending in the economy. This does not change Lender-U￿ s cost advantage and hence leaves its
ability to screen borrowers unaltered. However, it can signi￿cantly enhance Lender-U￿ s ability
to poach borrowers from Lender-I by pooling creditworthy borrowers with uncreditworthy ones.
5.2 Satisfying Occam￿ s Razor
In this section, I address the concern that the main result of the paper could be obtained in
a simpler model. Let us begin with the simple case of a monopolist lender. Would such a
lender adopt a pooling strategy that includes uncreditworthy borrowers in its portfolio? It
is important to remember that a monopolist lender would seek to extract the entire surplus
generated from the loan contract. Since creditworthy borrowers generate a higher (positive)
surplus than uncreditworthy types, a monopolist lender can always charge a signi￿cantly high
rate on loans so as to price out uncreditworthy types from the market. Therefore, one can
restrict attention to competitive markets for the desired result.
As mentioned before, the pooling equilibria described above have similarities to the over-
lending result under competition in De Meza and Webb (1987). However, the lack of screening
provisions in De Meza and Webb (1987) renders vacuous any discussion of lending standards.
Turning our attention to models which include the provision for borrower screening, we ￿nd
that for competition under asymmetric information, Nash equilibria are never pooling. This
is a fairly well established result in the literature on competition under asymmetric informa-
tion (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976, Wilson 1977). Importantly, Besanko and Thakor (1987)
demonstrate that the overlending problem of De Meza and Webb (1987) disappears if one al-
lows for the provision of borrower screening. Separation can be induced as borrowers with
lower risk of default choose contracts with lower interest rates and higher collateral require-
25ments whereas borrowers with higher risk of default choose contracts with higher interest rates
and lower collateral requirements. Modifying the framework in Besanko and Thakor (1987)
to asymmetrically informed lenders, this paper shows that for a signi￿cantly low value of the
lending cost, uninformed lenders can poach borrowers using pooling contracts. Moreover, these
pooling contracts attract non-creditworthy types as well. To conclude, it is di¢ cult to argue
that a simpler model allowing for screening provisions would illustrate equilibria linking a low
lending costs with lending to uncreditworthy borrowers.21
5.3 Cream Skimming on Entry
The only provision in the model that does not satisfy the dictum of Occam￿ s razor is the
inclusion of two creditworthy borrower types. Here the deviation from brevity allows us to
illustrate an interesting result that has its parallels in observed lending patterns. In terms
of the model, this result is illustrated as the equilibrium in Screen-3, where the uninformed
lender secures the low-risk borrower. The lenders split the market, with the uninformed lender
securing low-risk types, whereas the informed lender is saddled with high-risk types despite its
information advantage.
Recent empirical and theoretical studies suggest that the entry of outside lenders into credit
markets can lead to ￿cream-skimming￿ , whereby outside lender obtains a safer loan portfolio
on entry, leaving inside lenders with the riskier clients (see Dietragiache et al. (2008) and
references therein). Dietragiache et al. (2008) provide evidence on this phenomenon for the
entry of foreign banks into developing countries, also showing how this e⁄ect can be welfare
reducing. Their model shows that cream skimming arises primarily out of di⁄erences in lending
technologies between foreign and domestic lenders.
From an information perspective however, the phenomenon of cream skimming seems coun-
terintuitive. After all, how might an outside lender compete with a better informed inside
lender and yet, be successful in securing the most creditworthy clients in the borrower pool?
21This does not imply that competitive pooling equilibria cannot exist under adverse selection. Existence of
pooling equilibria in competitive screening models has been developed under more elaborate settings (see Dubey
and Geanakoplos (2002) and Martin (2007) for further details).
26Arguably, the inside lender should be able to use its information advantage to retain clients of
the highest quality.
The model presented here shows how this counterintuitive result may hold in equilibrium.
An uninformed lender￿ s cost advantage can help in o⁄ering a lower rate. When combined
with a su¢ ciently high collateral requirement, this low rate helps it secure only the low risk
types while screening bad-risks and high-risks. Even though the high-risks are creditworthy,
the uninformed lender doesn￿ t include them in its portfolio because it cannot sort them from
uncreditworthy types. Therefore, the market is split between the informed (inside) lender and
the uninformed (outside) lender, with the high-risk types borrowing from the informed lender
and the uninformed lender cream-skimming borrowers of the highest quality.
6 Implications of the Model
6.1 Bank Lending Cycles and lending costs
The model relates to a signi￿cant volume of research on the cyclicality of bank lending. The
traditional central bank response to increase rates to curb in￿ ation can bring about a drop in
bank lending from its peak of the credit cycle. These changes could occur either by a⁄ecting the
supply of bank credit, relative to other forms of credit as modeled in the traditional bank lending
channel (Kashyap and Stein, 2000) or by a change in lending standards, as demonstrated above.
Interestingly, Kashyap and Stein (2000) observe that tightening monetary policy has a greater
impact on smaller (local) lenders as opposed to larger banks.22 To the extent that smaller
local banks have the information advantage and their larger rivals have the cost advantage, one
could interpret this ￿nding as a⁄ecting the cost of the informed lender more than that of the
uninformed lender. In terms of this model, a tightening of monetary policy leads to an increase
in the uninformed lender￿ s cost advantage, which in turn increases the likelihood of screening
equilibria and a reduction in lending volumes.
Although there has been considerable work done on the cyclicality of bank lending, fewer
22Kashyap and Stein (2000) attribute this to smaller banks having less liquid balance sheets where liquidity is
measured as the ratio of securities to assets.
27studies have focused on the cyclicality of lending standards by banks. In recent work, Jimenez
et al. (2007) use the Spanish credit registry of more than 23 million bank loans to show how
changes in short term rates in￿ uence credit risk taking by lenders. In broad support of the
results of this model, they ￿nd that low lending costs prior to origination create excessive risk
taking by lenders. In a related study, Ioannidou et al. (2009) ￿nd evidence in support of this
result for the Bolivian credit market.23 Moreover, Ioannidou et al. (2009) ￿nd that risk pricing
is inadequate in times of lax lending because spreads do not re￿ ect the additional risk taken.
This phenomenon can be explained in terms of the model: Lending to uncreditworthy types
involves pooling equilibria, which, unlike borrower screening, does not allow for adequate risk
pricing of individual loans.
In their extensive panel study of loan contract terms, Asea and Blomberg (1998) ￿nd that
the environment supporting lax lending standards predate the peak of the credit cycle.24 As to
whether this occurs in the early stages of the upward phase or closer to the peak, is an open
research question. However, there is considerable evidence that points to the sticky response
of bank lending to market rates either due to credit rationing (Berger and Udell, 1994) or due
to institutional memory (Berger and Udell, 2002). Therefore, it is not inconceivable that a
low-rate environment, as the one that prevailed in the early part of this decade, contributes
signi￿cantly to the lax lending standards in the years that followed.25
A low interest rate environment is identi￿ed as a major factor in banks optimally lending to
uncreditworthy types. Admittedly, a sustained low rate environment as prevailed in the early
part of this decade was unprecedented in recent monetary history. However, the fallout in terms
of institutional lending was no less remarkable. For the ￿rst time in recent economic history
mainstream lenders penetrated ￿subprime￿markets making loans to borrowers who were until
23These studies exploit di⁄erent institutional arrangements for econometric identi￿cation. To establish the
exogeneity of monetary policy, Jimenez et al. (2009) utilize Spain￿ s membership to the European Monetary
Union while Ioannidou et al. (2009) exploit the ￿dollarization￿of Bolivia￿ s banking system.
24Asea and Blomberg (1998, p. 92) argue that ￿during booms asymmetric information in credit markets may
cause good projects to draw in bad ones.... bank lending standards have a more profound e⁄ect ... during
expansions￿ when the seeds of a future recession are sown￿ than during contractions￿This is contrast to the
traditional view that ￿cyclical changes in ￿rm ￿nancing are dominated by changes in bank lending, especially at
the peak and during the downward phase of the credit cycle.￿
25The Federal Reserve lowered the target federal funds rate from a high of 6.5 percent in early January 2001
to just one percent in January 2002. The FOMC statement released on August 2003 announced that ￿policy
accommodation can be maintained for a considerable period￿and the low rate environment continued well into
2004.
28now denied conventional sources of funds. The best example of this phenomenon is the entry
of mainstream lenders to the subprime mortgage market in the US. I discuss this example in
greater detail below. A lesser known phenomenon has been the entry of private banks into the
micro￿nance market in developing countries during this period.26
The driving forces behind changes in the lending patterns in terms of our model are the
lending costs of banks, independent of the source. The model also allows for a broader inter-
pretation of lending costs than suggested by deposit rates. Asymmetries in lending costs can
arise from di⁄erences in operating cost, interest expenses or even cost of ine¢ ciencies that arise
due to deviations from best-practices.27 Consequently, while deposit insurance can mitigate
asymmetry in the costs of funds for di⁄erent lenders, it cannot completely eliminate it.
Another feature of this model implies that lenders which increase market share by lending
aggressively during booms should ex post display higher default rates. This prediction seems
at odds with Ruckes (2004) and Dell￿ Ariccia and Marquez (2006) where portfolio quality is
similar across banks and each bank has similar acceptance of default risk when extending
loans. Interestingly, the model￿ s predictions are more in line with Rajan (1994) even though
the mechanism described in this model is di⁄erent. In the vein of Rajan (1994), di⁄erences
in loan quality across banks is most pronounced for those that successfully poach borrowers
during times of expansion. In the example below, I argue that this prediction seems consistent
with the anecdotal evidence documenting the signi￿cant growth and subsequent demise of all
top lenders in the subprime market.
6.2 An Example: Subprime Mortgage Market
Previous theoretical work on mortgage ￿nance, such as Brueckner (2000), extend the seminal
work on competitive screening models by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Besanko and
Thakor (1987) to a model of adverse selection in the mortgage market. Brueckner argues that
competition can induce separation in the mortgage market because riskier borrowers agree to a
26Reille and Forster (2008) record that, between 2004 and 2006, the stock of foreign capital investment￿
covering both debt and equity￿ more than tripled to US$4 billion.
27See Berger and Mester (2003) for a more formal treatment of the lending costs of banks.
29price premium for high loan-to-value (LTV) mortgages. Using Brueckner￿ s insight, this model
of borrower poaching and lender competition among asymmetrically informed principals can be
extended to explain the current turmoil in the mortgage market. Needless to say, recent events
are more complex than the mechanisms outlined in terms of this stylized model. Accordingly,
the aim here is somewhat modest: I discuss the causal link established above in light of some
of the evidence on recent events in ￿nancial markets. What follows is a simple description of
the intuition and some anecdotal evidence in support of the arguments.
While prime loans are made to borrowers with strong credit histories and a demonstrated
capacity to repay, loans to subprime borrowers involve elevated credit risk. In the early years,
a majority of subprime lenders were a combination of non-depository ￿nance companies, spe-
cialized subprime mortgage lenders, and local depository institutions (Temkin et. al, 2002).
Subsequently, subprime originations increased at a high rate of 25 percent per year from 1994
to 2003.28 Of course, other factors like changes in the regulatory structure, intense competi-
tion over pro￿ts in the prime market and the house price appreciation in the U.S. since 1996
signi￿cantly in￿ uenced the increase in subprime lending (Gramlich, 2004).
Interestingly, a signi￿cant majority of subprime mortgages are re￿nances, emphasizing the
role of repeated interaction(s) between borrowers and lenders in this market. Using First
American Loan Performance data on more than nine million securitized loans, Bhardwaj and
Sengupta (2009) ￿nd that between 60 to 72 percent of ￿rst-lien subprime originations between
1998 and 2007 were re￿nances. As the subprime market grew, poaching borrowers became
increasingly relevant because major players increased market share at the expense of other
informed lenders, including local lending companies.29
Translating the more general credit market framework to the case of the mortgage market
is simpler if we abstract from asset price movements. To describe the lender competition and
equilibrium in the context of the mortgage market, we use the screening mechanism described
in Brueckner (2000).30 It is important to point out that the loan amount in this model is
28Mortgage Market Statistical Annual, Inside Mortgage Finance Publications, various issues.
29It is important to point out that, of the largest and most notable subprime lenders in 2004 and 2005 such as
Ameriquest, New Century, Countrywide, and Wells Fargo, only Countrywide ranked among the top 10 lenders
in 2000 (Mortgage Market Statistical Annual, Inside Mortgage Finance Publications, various issues).
30A complete and formal description of the details is available in Brueckner (2000). The model abstracts from
30one dollar. Therefore, in the context of mortgage ￿nancing, the collateral requirement in the
model turns out to be the inverse of the LTV ratio on mortgages. In terms of the mechanism
described in the paper, competition would require uninformed lenders to screen borrowers
conditional on observable risk. Borrowers with higher unobservable risk self-select into contracts
with higher LTV (lower collateral requirement) and higher repayment. Lenders wary about
unobservable risk characteristics of subprime borrowers would ideally want borrowers to satisfy
a higher downpayment requirement before approving the mortgage. This unobservable risk
component assumes greater importance because a signi￿cant proportion of subprime borrowers
had incomplete or impaired documentation on loans. Interestingly, however, there has been
sharp increase in LTV on ￿rst-lien subprime mortgage originations from 2003 to 2005 (Bhardwaj
and Sengupta, 2009).
A plausible explanation for this increase in LTV on mortgage contracts can be given in terms
of the pooling equilibria described in the model. Screening equilibria in the model require both
a signi￿cant cost advantage over the informed lender to o⁄set screening costs and the low-risk
borrower￿ s ability to post the required collateral. The extent to which either condition was
met on subprime mortgage lending is not fully known. It is even less certain if such a cost
advantage could be used as an e⁄ective means of poaching borrowers. In this scenario, a large
secular decline in lending costs, as witnessed in the ￿rst half of this decade, would allow for
pooling equilibria. Accordingly, lenders could successfully attract borrowers away from local
competition by lowering downpayment (collateral) requirements (i.e., allowing higher LTV in
lieu of higher mortgage rates) on mortgage contracts.31 By doing so, they could e⁄ectively
be pooling creditworthy borrowers with uncreditworthy ones. Generally, lenders would be less
inclined to raise interest rates and relax LTV requirements because of the fear that such loans
are attractive to bad-risk types. However, in an environment where credit is cheap, lenders
expect to o⁄set these losses from bad-risks with pro￿ts from good-risk types.32
choice of housing consumption and prepayment risk.
31This would be especially true for borrowers seeking to re￿nance mortgages and/or extracting equity on their
homes. It is interesting to note that the proportion of ￿rst-lien subprime mortgages in the (cumulative) LTV
range of 90+ increased from 10 percent in 2000 to over 50 percent in 2006 (Bhardwaj and Sengupta, 2009)..
32As to whether this was a conscious forethought strategy by subprime lenders or whether such pooling was
viewed as a viable option under the circumstances as the events developed is an open research question. Ex post,
it is di¢ cult to argue that lenders did not err in their estimates on the proportion of bad risks in the borrower
population.
317 Conclusion
This paper presents a simple theoretical model as to how low lending costs prompts lenders
to include uncreditworthy borrowers in their loan portfolio. A secular decline in lending costs
does not help uninformed lenders to screen uncreditworthy borrowers, but it does allow them to
pool these borrowers with creditworthy types. This not only facilitates entry of outside lenders
into high-risk credit markets, but also makes it optimal for them to poach borrowers from rivals
by including non-creditworthy borrowers in their loan portfolio. The framework is particularly
relevant in explaining how an easing of monetary policy at the early part of this decade could
be a signi￿cant factor in lending to uncreditworthy borrowers in the mortgage market.
In conclusion, it is crucial to mention that the choice of the screening model is driven by
two considerations. The ￿rst is to illustrate how lender competition in the face of a low lending
costs can adversely a⁄ect borrower quality. The second is to demonstrate that this e⁄ect can
occur in the absence of an asset price boom. It is important to illustrate that the causal link
laid out in the model is independent of the traditional asset-based lending channels typically
used to describe this link. However, it is equally important to emphasize that this link can
occur in the presence of, or perhaps even reinforce, the traditional asset-based lending channel.
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36Appendix
Throughout, we will impose the boundary conditions [(1 ￿ ￿b)x ￿ V 0 ￿ ￿] < 0 and [(1 ￿ ￿g)(1 ￿
￿b)x ￿ (1 ￿ ￿g)V 0 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿b)￿] > 0 for g = h;l. The ￿rst condition also ensures that lenders￿o⁄ers
to screen out uncreditworthy borrowers do not have the undesirable property that C > R. The second
condition ensures that uncreditworthy types do not ￿nd the lenders￿competitive o⁄ers to creditworthy
types unattractive.
Lemma 1 For borrowers of type-b, the Lender-I denies credit. For borrowers of types g = h;l the












and ￿ Rg = x ￿ V 0
1￿￿g, g = h;l are the ￿rst-best (zero-collateral) minimum and maximum repayments,
respectively.
Proof. Since ￿I
b < 0, the Lender-I denies credit to the b-type. Since Lender-I knows borrower
type, we can focus our attention without loss of generality to either creditworthy type g = h;l. We ￿rst
show that Lender-I will always o⁄er zero-collateral contracts.
We prove by contradiction. Suppose not, that is, there exists an o⁄er with a positive collateral
requirement from Lender-U, (R1
g;C1
g), that yields non-negative pro￿ts, ￿I
g(R1
g;C1



























g) > 0. As long as C1




g) which provides borrower g with the same payo⁄ as (R1
g;C1
g). All such deviations yield
higher pro￿ts for Lender-I. Therefore, Lender-I will always choose a contract that sets its collateral
requirement to zero. The ￿rst-best (zero-collateral) minimum repayment is obtained by setting ￿I
g = 0;
g = h;l. The ￿rst-best (zero-collateral) maximum is obtained by setting Vg(RI
g;0) = V 0;g = h;l.
Three categories of equilibria are characterized in terms of Lender-U￿ s o⁄ers. For example, any
equilibria wherein Lender-U￿ s o⁄ers successfully screen borrower types are characterized as separating
equilibria of the model.33 A second category involves pooling equilibria wherein Lender-U￿ s o⁄er of a
single contract is accepted by two or more borrower types. Finally, there is a third category of equilibria
33The terms ￿sorting￿ , ￿screening￿ and ￿separating￿ are used interchangeably. Also, the terms ￿bunching￿
and ￿pooling￿are used interchangeably. A successful sorting occurs when, conditional on each borrower type
37wherein Lender-U￿ s o⁄ers involve the bunching (or pooling) of adjacent borrower types while screening
the non-adjacent borrower type. This occurs, when, for example, Lender-U bunches the creditworthy
borrowers (the l-type and the h-type) while screening the uncreditworthy borrower (b-type). Since
Lender-U￿ s equilibrium o⁄er involves both pooling and screening, we characterize this third category of
equilibria as hybrid equilibria. It is important to mention here that these are candidate equilibria which
emerge as the ￿nal equilibria of the model for di⁄erent values of the model parameters.
The three categories of candidate equilibria: pooling, screening, and hybrid are summarized in Table
1. Within each category, candidate-1 has a larger number of borrower types accepting o⁄ers from
Lender-U than candidate-2 or candidate-3. For example, in candidate equilibrium Hybrid-2, Lender-U
screens out the b-type, but in Hybrid-1 it pools them with h-types. If Lender-U can screen the b-type
from the h-type, but not sort between the h-type and the l-type, then its o⁄ers in Screen-2 would be
accepted by the h-types. Conversely, if Lender-U can sort creditworthy types, but not screen out the
b-type (or even pool them with h-types), Lender-U￿ s o⁄er in Screen-3 would be accepted by the l-types.
However, if Lender-U can sort between all borrower types, it can o⁄er Screen-1 whose pro￿ts dominate
those of Screen-2 and Screen-3. Similarly, for a given distribution of borrower types, the Lender-U￿ s
o⁄ers in Hybrid-1 dominate those in Pool-2. There is no equilibrium in which Lender-U bunches the
non-adjacent, b- and l-types.
Lender-U￿ s o⁄er in equilibria
The case for which Lender-U successfully captures creditworthy borrower types is discussed ￿rst. In
order to do so, the payo⁄from Lender-U￿ s o⁄ers to each borrower type must be at least as good as those
from Lender-I. Therefore, Lender-U￿ s optimization problem for the case where it successfully sorts all
borrower types can be written as follows:34




accepting Lender-U￿ s o⁄ers, Lender-U makes non-negative pro￿ts overall. Unless otherwise mentioned, we will
restrict attention to successful sorting (and pooling) in what follows.
34In this section, for the most part, we drop the superscript denoting o⁄ers by borrower U. Therefore, unless
otherwise mentioned, we are considering pro￿ts and o⁄ers of Lender-U only. We will re-introduce superscripts
below.
38where ￿U
k =(1 ￿ ￿k)RU
k + ￿￿kCU
k ￿ ￿U, k = b;h;l subject to the following participation constraints
Vb(Rb;Cb) ￿ V 0 (4)
Vh(Rh;Ch) ￿ ￿ V I
h (5)
Vl(Rl;Cl) ￿ ￿ V I
l (6)
and the following incentive compatibility constraints
Vb(Rb;Cb) ￿ Vb(Rh;Ch) (7)
Vb(Rb;Cb) ￿ Vb(Rl;Cl) (8)
Vh(Rh;Ch) ￿ Vh(Rb;Cb) (9)
Vh(Rh;Ch) ￿ Vh(Rl;Cl) (10)
Vl(Rl;Cl) ￿ Vl(Rb;Cb) (11)
Vl(Rl;Cl) ￿ Vl(Rh;Ch): (12)
Note that since ￿U
b < 0, Lender-U does not o⁄er contract (Rb;Cb) in equilibrium. Therefore, (4),
(9) and (11) are redundant. Moreover, one may replace Vb(Rb;Cb) with the b-type￿ s reservation utility
V 0 on the left-hand side of (7) and(8). Consequently, the above maximization problem in (3)-(12)
reduces to





k =(1 ￿ ￿k)RU
k + ￿￿kCU
k ￿ ￿U, k = b;h;l subject to the following participation constraints
Vh(Rh;Ch) ￿ ￿ V I
h (14)
Vl(Rl;Cl) ￿ ￿ V I
l (15)
39and the following incentive compatibility constraints
V 0 ￿ Vb(Rh;Ch) (16)
V 0 ￿ Vb(Rl;Cl) (17)
Vh(Rh;Ch) ￿ Vh(Rl;Cl) (18)
Vl(Rl;Cl) ￿ Vl(Rh;Ch): (19)
Lemma 2 In any equilibirum o⁄er by Lender-U, its expected pro￿ts from loans to l-types are non-
negative, ￿U
l (Rl;Cl) ￿ 0.
Proof. Suppose not, that is there exist equilibria in which ￿U
l (Rl;Cl) < 0. It follows that
￿U
b (Rl;Cl) < ￿U
h (Rl;Cl) < ￿U
l (Rl;Cl) < 0. Lender-U can always drop this contract and increase
pro￿ts. Therefore, in any equilibrium, it is always the case that ￿U
l (Rl;Cl) ￿ 0.
Lemma 3 In any equilibirum o⁄er by Lender-U that is accepted by the l-type, the IR constraint of the
l-type, (15), must bind.
Proof. Case 1: Lender-U does not sort h-type from l-type






g) > ￿ V I
l (20)
We will show that there exists an o⁄er (R2
g;C2
g) such that it satis￿es (15) but yields higher pro￿t. We












35Since Lender-U does not sort, h-type and l-types are bunched with a single o⁄er. Consequently, (18) and























g) is a solution, it satis￿es all the constraints. Consequently, we can show that o⁄er (R2
g;C2
g)
in (21) and (23) satis￿es all other constraints as well. Constraints (15), (16) and (17) are satis￿ed by
construction.36
It remains to be shown that (14) is satis￿ed. We prove by contradiction. Suppose not, then
Vh(R1
g;C1
g) ￿ ￿ V I
h > Vh(R2
g;C2
g). It follows that ￿I < (1 ￿ ￿h)R2
g + ￿hC2
g. From (23), we ob-
tain ￿I ￿ (1 ￿ ￿l)R2
g + ￿lC2
g. Combining the two, we have (1 ￿ ￿h)R2
g + ￿hC2







Since ￿h > ￿l , it must be the case that C2
g > R2
g. This is impossible given our intial assumption
[(1 ￿ ￿b)x ￿ V 0 ￿ ￿I] < 0, so that all lender o⁄ers to creditworthy types have the property R ￿ C.





















an equilibrium because Lender-U can o⁄er an alternative contract of the form (R2
g;C2
g) and increase
pro￿ts. Such pro￿table deviations are not possible only if Vl(Rg;Cg) = ￿ V I
l . Therefore (15) must bind
in equilibrium.
Case 2: when Lender-U sorts creditworthy types.
We prove by contradiction. Suppose not, that is, there exists a solution to (13)-(19) characterized
36Since Lender-U has only one o⁄er for all creditworthy types, (16) and (17) are the same constraint.
41by f(Rh;Ch);(R1
l ;C1
l )g such that
Vl(R1
l ;C1
l ) > ￿ V I
l (24)
We will show that there exist a menu f(Rh;Ch);(R2
l ;C2
l )g such that it satis￿es (15) but yields higher
pro￿t. We begin by characterizing this contract. Consider contract (R2
l ;C2



















l ) < Vl(R1
l ;C1
l )
Following this, we can choose (R2
l ;C2
l ) such that either of the following are true
Vl(R1
l ;C1
l ) > Vl(R2
l ;C2




l ) > Vl(R2
l ;C2
l ) ￿ ￿ V I
l > Vl(Rh;Ch) (28)
First, we show that the menu f(Rh;Ch);(R2
l ;C2
l )g in (25) and either (27) or (28) satis￿es all other
constraints as well. Constraints (14) and (16) are trivially satis￿ed. Constraint (15), (17) and (19) are
satis￿ed by construction. Lastly, (18) is satis￿ed because Vh(Rh;Ch) ￿ Vl(R1
l ;C1
l ) > Vl(R2
l ;C2
l ).
Next, we show that by o⁄ering (R2
l ;C2
l ) instead of (R1
l ;C1





l , we have using (25)37,
￿l(R2
l ;C2





l )g cannot be an equilibrium because Lender-U can o⁄er an alter-
native contract of the form f(Rh;Ch);(R2
l ;C2
l )g and increase pro￿ts.
Note that this holds for either (27) or (28). For (27), all deviations from (R1
l ;C1
l ) to (R2
l ;C2
l ) yield














l ) and ￿b(1 ￿ ￿l) ￿ ￿￿l(1 ￿ ￿b) >
(1 ￿ ￿)￿l(1 ￿ ￿b) > 0.
42higher pro￿ts, unless Vl(Rl;Cl) = Vl(Rh;Ch); in which case, Lender-U bunches h-types and l-types
and we follow the proof as given in Case 1 above. Alternatively, for (28) such pro￿table deviations are
not possible only if Vl(Rl;Cl) = ￿ V I
l . Therefore (15) must bind in equilibrium.
Lemma 4 In any equilibrium wherein Lender-U screens out the b-type, the IC constraint of the b-type
w.r.t the h-type, (16), must bind.
Proof. Case 1: when Lender-U sorts creditworthy types.




V 0 > Vb(R1
h;C1
h)
We will show that there exist menus such as f(R2
h;C2
h);(Rl;Cl)g that satisfy (16) all the other con-
























Therefore, if V 0 > Vb(R1
h;C1
h), we can choose (R2
h;C2
h) so that







h);(Rl;Cl)g is a solution, it satis￿es all the constraints. Consequently, we can show
that menus f(R2
h;C2
h);(Rl;Cl)g satisfy all the constraints as well. Constraints (15) and (17) are triv-


















h);(Rl;Cl)g cannot be an equilibrium because Lender-U can o⁄er an alternative
contract of the form f(R2
h;C2
h);(Rl;Cl)g and increase pro￿ts. Such pro￿table deviations are not possible
only if V 0 = Vb(Rh;Ch). Therefore (16) must bind in equilibrium.
Case 2: Lender-U does not sort h-type from l-type
This holds for either creditworthy type, yielding two sets of equilibria where Lender-U screens out
just the b-type. The ￿rst occurs when g = h, and Lender-U captures only the h-type by screening
them from the b-type, as described in the candidate equilibria Screen-2. The second occurs when g = l
and Lender-U captures both h- and l-types by bunching them and screening them from the b-type, as
described in the candidate equilibria Hybrid-2.
We prove by contradiction for Hybrid-2. Suppose not, that is, there exists a solution to (13)-




g) is the o⁄er to both the h-type and the l-type, and
V 0 > Vb(R1
g;C1
























Following this, we can restrict our attention to contracts such that







g) is a solution, it satis￿es all the constraints. Consequently, we can show that o⁄er (R2
g;C2
g)
38Since Lender-U does not sort, h-type and l-types are bunched with a single o⁄er. Consequently, (18) and
(19) are trivially satis￿ed.
44in (31) and (33) satis￿es all other constraints as well. Constraints (15), (16) and (17) are satis￿ed by
construction.39 Lastly, (14) is satis￿ed from (32).
In o⁄ering (R2
g;C2
g) instead of (R1
g;C1
g), Lender-U￿ s change in pro￿ts from the l-type and h-type
are given by
￿￿U










Since bunching is only feasible for ￿l ￿ ￿h and
(1 ￿ ￿)￿l >
(1 ￿ ￿)￿l(1 ￿ ￿h)
(1 ￿ ￿l)
>
￿l(1 ￿ ￿h) ￿ ￿￿h(1 ￿ ￿l)
(1 ￿ ￿l)
Therefore Lender-U￿ s o⁄er of (R2
g;C2







g). This implies that (R1
g;C1
g) cannot be an equilibrium. Such deviations
are no longer possible if Vb(Rg;Cg) = V 0.
Proceeding exactly as above, we can prove the same for candidate equilibria Screen-2, where Lender-
U￿ s o⁄ers are accepted by the h-types only.
Lemma 5 In any equilibrium wherein Lender-U sorts the h-types from the l-type, the IC constraint of
the h-type w.r.t the l-type,(18), must bind.
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Suppose not, that is, there exists a solution to (13)-(19)
characterized by f(Rh;Ch);(R1
l ;C1




We will show that there exist a menus of contracts f(Rh;Ch);(R2
l ;C2
l )g such that it satis￿es (18) and
all the other constraints but yields higher pro￿t. We begin by characterizing this contract. Consider
39Since Lender-U has only one o⁄er for all creditworthy types, (18) and (19) are the same constraint.
45contract (R2
l ;C2







l ) = Vl(R2
l ;C2















l ) > Vh(R1
l ;C1
l ), we can choose (R2
l ;C2
l ) so that
Vh(Rh;Ch) ￿ Vh(R2
l ;C2





l )g is a solution, it satis￿es all the constraints. Consequently, we can show that
the menu f(Rh;Ch);(R2
l ;C2
l )g in (34) and (35) satis￿es all the constraints as well. Constraints (14)
and (16) are trivially satis￿ed. Constraint (15) and (19) are satis￿ed by construction.
For (17), we prove by contradiction. Suppose not, then Vb(R2
l ;C2
l ) > V 0. In addition, Lemma 4
implies Vb(R2
l ;C2
l ) > V 0 = Vb(Rh;Ch). That is, (1 ￿ ￿b)(Rh ￿ R2
l ) > ￿b(C2
l ￿ Ch). Also, because
(35) holds, it follows that ￿h(C2
l ￿ Ch) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿h)(Rh ￿ R2





l ) > (C2












l ) > 0
Since the ￿rst expression is negative, this would imply R2
l > Rh. Similarly we can show that C2
l < Ch.
However, since (19) is satis￿ed, we get (1 ￿ ￿l)(Rh ￿ R2
l ) > ￿l(C2
l ￿ Ch). Again, using (35) it follows
that ￿h(C2
l ￿ Ch) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿h)(Rh ￿ R2





l ) > (C2












l ) > 0
46Now, since the ￿rst expression is positive, this would imply R2
l < Rh. Similarly we can show that
C2
l > Ch. We have a contradiction. Therefore, it cannot be the case that Vb(R2
l ;C2






l , using (34), we get
￿l(R2
l ;C2





l )g cannot be an equilibrium because Lender-U can o⁄er an alter-
native contract of the form f(Rh;Ch);(R2
l ;C2
l )g and increase pro￿ts. Such pro￿table deviations are
not possible only if Vh(Rh;Ch) = Vh(Rl;Cl). Therefore (18) must bind in equilibrium.
Lender-U￿ s o⁄ers in screening equilibria
Consequently, the above maximization problem in (3)-(12) reduces to




k =(1 ￿ ￿k)RU
k + ￿￿kCU
k ￿ ￿U, subject to the following participation constraints
Vh(Rh;Ch) ￿ ￿ V I
h (37)
Vl(Rl;Cl) = ￿ V I
l (38)
and the following incentive compatibility constraints
V 0 = Vb(Rh;Ch) (39)
V 0 ￿ Vb(Rl;Cl) (40)
Vh(Rh;Ch) = Vh(Rl;Cl) (41)
Vl(Rl;Cl) ￿ Vl(Rh;Ch): (42)
47Using the equations (37)-(42), we obtain expressions for (Rh;Ch) and (Rl;Cl) as follows:
RU
g ￿ Rl ￿ RU
l ;
RU
h ￿ Rh ￿ RU
g
CU
g ￿ Cl ￿ CU
l
CU





































[(1 ￿ ￿b)x ￿ V 0]. (47)
Since we assume [(1 ￿ ￿b)x ￿ V 0 ￿ ￿I] < 0 and [(1 ￿ ￿g)(1 ￿ ￿b)x ￿ (1 ￿ ￿g)V 0 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿b)￿I] > 0
for g = h;l all of the o⁄ers given by (43)-(47) are strictly positive.
From (37)-(42), note that if the o⁄er to h-types is (Rh;Ch) = (RU
h ;CU
h ), then the o⁄er to l-types is
(Rl;Cl) = (RU
l ;CU
l ) and vice-versa. Likewise, (Rh;Ch) = (Rl;Cl) = (RU
g ;CU
g ) is an o⁄er satisfying
(37)-(42) in which Lender-U bunches both h-types and l-types.
Lemma 6 In any equilibrium wherein Lender-U sorts the h-types from the l-type, the IR constraint of
the l-type, (37) must bind.
Proof. First note that Vh(RU
h ;CU
h ) = ￿ V I
h . Also lemmas 3-5 hold.


















h ) = ￿ V I
h













l )g would increase pro￿ts from the l-types but decrease
pro￿ts from the h-types as follows:
￿￿U








h ) > 0
￿￿U
h = ￿




h ) < 0
For given values of ￿h and ￿l, the e⁄ect on total pro￿ts ￿U is either monotonically increasing or
monotonically decreasing with the magnitude of the deviation (C2
h ￿ CU
h ).40 In particular, if the e⁄ect









l )g.That is, pro￿ts are maximized by o⁄ering (RU
g ;CU
g ) which does not induce
separation. Therefore, in an equilibrium that induces separation of the h-types and l-types, (37) must
bind.
We are now in a position to list the candidate equilibria of the model. These are given below in
Propositions 7-14. They are candidate equilibria of the model. In what follows, we hold the value of
Lender-U￿ s lending costs ￿xed at ￿U and vary the value of Lender-I￿ s lending costs, ￿I. Depending
on the distribution of borrower types ￿b and ￿h, and the value of ￿I we can determine which of the
following candidate equilibria will emerge as the ￿nal equilibrium of the model. Hereafter, we reintroduce
the superscripts I and U for lenders￿o⁄ers and pro￿ts.
Candidate equilibrium: Screen-1
We can now state Lender-U￿ s o⁄ers under Screen-1 in terms of the following proposition.
Proposition 7 A pure strategy equilibrium wherein Lender-U separates all borrower types occurs when




S ) and is characterized as follows:




l )g given by (43), (46) and (47).
(b) Lender-I o⁄ers (R
ﬂ
I
h;0) to h-types and (R
ﬂ
I
l ;0) to l-types.
(c) b-types types reject o⁄ers from either lender. Both creditworthy types accept o⁄ers from Lender-U,





l = 0, then all points satisfying (37)-(42) can be supported as












￿b(1 ￿ ￿h) ￿ ￿￿h(1 ￿ ￿b)
￿U +
(1 ￿ ￿)￿h(1 ￿ ￿h)
￿b(1 ￿ ￿h) ￿ ￿￿h(1 ￿ ￿b)
[(1 ￿ ￿b)x ￿ V 0].
Proof. In any screening equilibrium wherein Lender-U separates all borrower types, Lemmas 1-6




l )g. Moreover, in equilibrium,
Lender-I gives the break-even contract o⁄ers to each type, that is (R
ﬂ
I








l ) ￿ 0. This occurs when ￿I ￿ ~ ￿
h;l
S = 1
1￿(1￿￿)￿l￿U. Similarly, Lender-U can screen the
h-type from the b-type, if ￿U
h (RU
h ;CU







￿b(1 ￿ ￿h) ￿ ￿￿h(1 ￿ ￿b)
￿U +
(1 ￿ ￿)￿h(1 ￿ ￿h)
￿b(1 ￿ ￿h) ￿ ￿￿h(1 ￿ ￿b)
[(1 ￿ ￿b)x ￿ V 0].




S ). However, if ~ ￿
h;l
S > ￿I ￿
~ ￿
b;h
S or ~ ￿
b;h
S > ￿I ￿ ~ ￿
h;l
S , Lender-U still has the option to just screen one creditworthy type, as given by
the following propositions.
Candidate Equilibrium: Screen-2
Proposition 8 A pure strategy equilibrium wherein Lender-U screens out just the b-type and lends to
the h-types only, occurs when ~ ￿
h;l
S > ￿I ￿ ~ ￿
b;h
S and is characterized as follows:




l )g, with (RU
h ;CU
h ) given by (46) and (47) and (R0
l ;C0
l )
given as in (b) below
(b) Lender-I o⁄ers (R
ﬂ
I
h;0) to h-types and (RI
l ;0) to l-types where ￿U
l (R0
l ;C0






l ), and Vl(R0
l ;C0
l ) = Vl(RI
l ;0).
(c) b-types reject o⁄ers from either lender. h-types accept o⁄ers from Lender-U, but l-types accept the
o⁄er from Lender-I.
50Proof. The maximization problem for Screen-2 is the same as that of Screen-1, except for the fact
that now ~ ￿
h;l
S > ￿I ￿ ~ ￿
b;h
S . Therefore, in Screen-2, all the results of Screen-1 hold except for the lenders￿
o⁄ers to the l-type. This implies that since ~ ￿
h;l




l ) as given in (43), if o⁄ered,
would yield negative pro￿ts for Lender-U. Also, so that h-types do not ￿nd the o⁄er to the l-types
attractive, any such o⁄er would have to satisfy (41). Therefore, the best contract (highest borrower
payo⁄) Lender-U can o⁄er to the l-type is given by (R0
l ;C0
l ), where ￿U
l (R0
l ;C0
l ) = 0. For any such
o⁄er, (38) is not satis￿ed: Vl(R0
l ;C0
l ) < ￿ V I




to retain l-types. Lender-I can o⁄er (RI
l ;0) instead, so that Vl(R0
l ;C0
l ) = Vl(RI
l ;0) and still retain
the l-type with higher pro￿ts.
Candidate equilibrium: Screen-3
Proposition 9 A pure strategy equilibrium wherein Lender-U separates only the l-types occurs when
~ ￿
b;h
S > ￿I ￿ ~ ￿
h;l
S and ~ ￿h ￿ ￿I ￿ ~ ￿
h;l
S , where ~ ￿h = 1
1￿(1￿￿)￿h￿U, is characterized as follows:
(a) Lender-U o⁄ers menu (RU
l ;CU
l ) given by (43).
(b) Lender-I o⁄ers (R
ﬂ
I
h;0) to h-types and (R
ﬂ
I
l ;0) to l-types,
(c) Only the l-type accepts the o⁄er from Lender-U. The h-type is retained by Lender-I.
Proof. The maximization problem for Screen-3 is the same as that of Screen-1, except for the fact
that now ~ ￿
b;h
S > ￿I ￿ ~ ￿
h;l
S . Lender-U can simply make and o⁄er to (RU
l ;CU
l ) as given in (43). This
implies that since ~ ￿
b;h




h ) as given in (46)-(47), if o⁄ered, would yield negative




h;0) as before. Note that while Lender-U cannot match this o⁄er, Lender-I cannot raise RI
h because
the h-types are just indi⁄erent between its o⁄er of (R
ﬂ
I
h;0) and Lender-U￿ s o⁄er of (RU
l ;CU
l ). It is
important, therefore, that Lender-U￿ s pro￿ts from h-types are non-positive. That is ~ ￿h ￿ ￿I, where
~ ￿h ￿ 1
1￿(1￿￿)￿h￿U.
Equilibria with Lender-U pooling the b-type
When the proportion of the b-type is su¢ ciently small, Lender-U can choose to pool them with cred-
itworthy types. There are two such types of equilibria; one, where b-types are pooled with the h-type
51and the other where all types are pooled together.
Lemma 10 In any equibrium where the Lender-U pools the bad-risk type, it o⁄ers a zero collateral
contract.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose not, that is, there exists a pooling equilibrium
where Lender-U￿ s o⁄ers (R1
P;C1
P) and pools all borrowers. Since l-types accept this contract, we must
have from Lemma 3 that Vl(R1
P;C1
P) = ￿ V I






















Therefore, both b-types and h-types accept this new contract as it yields them higher payo⁄. But
(R2
P;C2
P) yields Lender-U higher pro￿ts than (R1
P;C1
P).41 Proceeding just as in the cases above, this
implies that in equilibrium where Lender-U pools all borrowers, CP = 0.
Note that in the same way, we can show that this result holds in an equilibrium where Lender-U
pools just the h- and b-types, but not the l-types.
Candidate Equilibrium: Pool-1
Proposition 11 A pure strategy equilibrium wherein Lender-U pools all borrowers occurs if ￿I ￿
~ ￿1
P(￿ ( 1￿￿
1￿E(￿))￿U) and is characterized as follows:




(b) Lender-I o⁄ers (R
ﬂ
I
h;0) to h-types and (R
ﬂ
I
l ;0) to l-types.
(c) All borrowers go to the Lender-U for loans.
Proof. First, from lemma 10, it follows that the pooling o⁄er is of the form (RP;0). Since the
41One can show this proceeding in a similar way as in Case 2 for Lemma 4. Also note that pooling is feasible
only if ￿l ￿ ￿b + ￿h.
52pooling o⁄er must yield non-negative pro￿ts, it must satisfy
[1 ￿ E(￿)]RP ￿ ￿U (48)
where E(￿) ￿ ￿b￿b + ￿h￿h + ￿l￿l is the expected value of ￿. This implies that pooling is feasible for
contracts of the form (RP;0) such that RP ￿ ￿U=[1￿E(￿)]. Third, for a pooling contract (RP;0) to




that is ￿I ￿ (
1￿￿l
1￿E(￿))￿U ￿ ~ ￿1
P. Since increasing RP increases pro￿ts, Lender-U o⁄ers (R
ﬂ
I
l ;0) such that
the participation constraint of l-types just bind.
Candidate Equilibrium: Pool-2
Proposition 12 A pure strategy equilibrium wherein Lender-U pools b-types and h-types occurs if
￿I ￿ ~ ￿2
P and is characterized as follows:




(b) Lender-I o⁄ers (R
ﬂ
I
h;0) to h-types and (RI
l ;0) to l-types where ￿U
l (R0
l ;C0










(c) Both b-type and h-type borrowers accept Lender-U￿ s o⁄er, while l-types accept Lender-I0s o⁄er.
Proof. Following the same procedure as above, we know that the pooling o⁄er must yield non-
negative pro￿ts. So it must satisfy
[1 ￿ (￿b￿b + ￿h￿h)]RP ￿ ￿U (49)
This implies that pooling is feasible for contracts of the form (RP;0) such that RP ￿ ￿U=[1￿(￿b￿b +
￿h￿h)]. For this pooling contract (RP;0) to hold, the entrant has to ensure that h-types accept its
o⁄er. Therefore, it must be true that RP ￿R
ﬂ
I
h, that is ￿I ￿ (
1￿￿h
1￿(￿b￿b+￿h￿h))￿U ￿ ~ ￿2
P. Since increasing
RP increases pro￿ts, Lender-U o⁄ers (R
ﬂ
I
h;0) such that the participation constraint of the h-types just
bind. Likewise, Lender-I￿ s o⁄ers (RI
l ;0) where RI
l ￿ ￿ RI
l to l-types is exactly as given in Screen-2, and
yields the best payo⁄ that Lender-U could o⁄er them.
53Hybrid Equilibria
Hybrid equilibria has elements of pooling and screening. This occurs when Lender-U pools or bunches
adjacent types but screens the non-adjacent types. The hybrid equilibria can be described as follows.
Candidate Equilibrium: Hybrid-1
Proposition 13 A pure strategy equilibrium wherein Lender-U separates only the l-types and bunches
(pools) the b-types and the h-types occurs when ~ ￿
b;h
S > ￿I ￿ ~ ￿
h;l
S and ￿I ￿ ~ ￿2
P, and is characterized as
follows:





l )g given by (43).
(b) Lender-I o⁄ers (R
ﬂ
I
h;0) to h-types and (R
ﬂ
I
l ;0) to l-types.
(c) The l-type accepts the o⁄er (RU
l ;CU





Proof. Since ~ ￿
b;h
S > ￿I ￿ ~ ￿
h;l
S , Lender-U cannot sort the h-types from b-types but can sort l-types
from h-types. Lender-U o⁄ers (RU
l ;CU
l ) as given in (43). Just as in Screen-1, this is accepted by
l-types and rejected by b-types and the h-types. Also, as was the case for Pool-2, for a su¢ ciently low
￿b and ￿I ￿ ~ ￿2
P, Lender-U o⁄ers (R
ﬂ
I
h;0), which is accepted by the b-type and the h-type and yields
non-negative pro￿ts.42
Candidate Equilibrium: Hybrid-2
Proposition 14 A pure strategy equilibrium wherein Lender-U screens out the b-types and bunches
the l-type and the h-type occurs when ￿I ￿ ~ ￿Y is characterized as follows:
(a) Lender-U o⁄ers menu (RU
g ;CU
g ) given by (44) and (45)
(b) Lender-I o⁄ers (R
ﬂ
I
h;0) to h-types and (R
ﬂ
I
l ;0) to l-types.
(c) The h-type and the l-type accept the o⁄er (RU
g ;CU
g ). The b-types reject this o⁄er.
Proof. First, as l-types accept Lender-U￿ s o⁄er Lemma 3 must hold. Also, because Lender-U
42Note that, since ￿
I > ￿








h;0) maximizes the Lender-U￿ s
pro￿ts from this bunching.
54screens out the b-types, Lemma 4 must hold. Therefore, Vl(R;C) = ￿ V I
l and V 0 = Vb(R;C). Solving
these two equations for (R;C), we get Lender-U￿ s o⁄ers to be (RU
g ;CU
g ). Note that Vh(RU
g ;CU
g ) > ￿ V I
h ,
and therefore, h-types borrow from Lender-U.
55